Why Nationalism Read online

  Why Nationalism

  Why

  Why

  Nationalism

  Yael Tamir

  Princeton University Press

  Princeton and Ox ford

  Copyright © 2019 by Princeton University Press

  Published by Princeton University Press

  41 Wil iam Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

  6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR

  press.princeton.edu

  All Rights Reserved

  Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953761

  ISBN 9780691190105

  British Library Cataloging- in- Publication Data is available

  Editorial: Rob Tempio and Matt Rohal

  Production Editorial: Mark Bel is

  Text Design: Leslie Flis

  Jacket Design: Layla Mac Rory

  Production: Jacqueline Poirier

  Publicity: James Schneider

  Copyeditor: Dawn Hall

  This book has been composed in Arno Pro

  Printed on acid- free paper. ∞

  Printed in the United States of America

  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  This book is dedicated

  with much love and admiration

  to my great teacher and mentor

  Sir Isaiah Berlin

  Contents

  Foreword b y Dani Rodrik ix

  A Personal Note xiii

  Part I: The Return of History

  1 The New Nationalism 3

  2 Never Say Never 13

  3 Untidy Compromises 22

  4 The Two Faces of Janus 26

  5 Nutopia 33

  Part II: Love and Marriage:

  The Virtues of Nationalism

  6 Living beyond Our Psychological Means 43

  7 Nation Building 52

  8 National Creativity 61

  9 This Place We Call Home 68

  vi i • Contents

  10 La Vie Quotidian 72

  11 Subjects into Citizens 77

  12 A Short History of the Cross- Class Coalition 85

  Part III: A Divided House

  13 The Breakdown of the Cross- Class Coalition 93

  14 One Nation, Divided, under Stress 102

  15 The Elephant in the Room 108

  16 The Birth of a Nationalist 119

  17 The Nationalism of the Vulnerable 127

  18 The Nationalism of the Affluent 142

  Part IV: A New Social Contract

  19 Liberal Nationalism 155

  20 This Is the Time 166

  21 A Race to the Bottom 172

  Notes 183

  Index 199

  Foreword

  Nationalism is one of those words that evokes a knee- jerk, in-

  variably negative response in polite company. Associated with

  military aggression, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, it is tainted

  by the worst horrors of the twentieth century. Our present- day

  demagogues in the United States and Europe— Donald Trump,

  Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orban, and others— are further reinforcing

  this image by fanning the flames of nativism, xenophobia, and

  religious bigotry in its name.

  Yael “Yuli” Tamir sees the destructive forces that nationalism

  can unleash. But she also sees something else that few liberals do

  these days: a modern democracy needs nationalism— or the

  nation- state— as much as it needs liberalism. As she explains in

  this fascinating book, decades of economic prosperity and appar-

  ent political consensus over liberal democratic principles have

  blinded us to the work nationalism was doing beneath the surface.

  Professor Tamir’s bold thesis is that this work was, for the most

  part, constructive. The spread of economic opportunity, education,

  and political equality were all the products, she says, of an “alliance

  between the nation and the state.” No institution has done better

  than the nation- state, and there are no alternatives yet in sight.

  Bolder still is Yuli Tamir’s call for a return to a nationalist

  ethos. Is “Putting America First?” a fascist slogan, she asks. Her

  answer: not necessarily. To be sure, she is not defending the

  xenophobic nativism of Donald Trump. Nationalism need not

  mean a sense of supremacy vis- à- vis other nations. It can serve

  instead “a desire to regenerate a sense of commitment among

  fellow nationals.” Liberals must relearn the indispensable unify-

  ing role that a shared, cross- class cultural narrative plays.

  x • Foreword

  The uncomfortable fact for many liberals and socialists alike

  is that “no social contract and no system of distribution can func-

  tion as an open political framework”— that is, without borders

  and rules on who belongs, who doesn’t. The nation and the state

  depend on each other. Tamir emphasizes here the cultural, psy-

  chological content of nationalism— the meaning- creation as-

  pect that ties us to each other. I would emphasize equally the

  economic aspects. The nation, however constructed, needs

  the state to provide what an economist would call public

  goods— education, infrastructure, law and order. The state in

  turn needs the nation for legitimacy, interpersonal trust, and a

  sense of common fate.

  The key question is: who are the people? Liberals and na-

  tionalists differ in what Tamir calls their “ethos of formation”:

  nationalists stress history and fate while liberals believe in

  voluntarism. But, as she points out, true voluntarism is an option

  for only a lucky few. Only a tiny minority of skilled professionals

  and wealthy investors has the luxury to roam the world in pur-

  suit of wider social networks and expanded economic oppor-

  tunities. These cosmopolitan globalists— citizens of nowhere, in

  Theresa May’s evocative language— have managed to revoke

  their responsibilities within their home nation without in fact

  taking on corresponding obligations anywhere else. The result-

  ing economic and social polarization within nations makes it

  much more difficult to construct a “unifying narrative.” With the

  elites having absconded thanks to globalization, the political

  playing field is now wide open for nativist extremists.

  Tamir recognizes that nationalism can be exclusionary and

  turn nasty when it is coupled with violation of minority groups’

  rights. She argues that this can be overcome by accepting the

  right to be different and fostering empathy for citizens who are

  cultural outsiders. In the end, she acknowledges that her brand

  Foreword • xi

  of nationalism is a compromise among liberal and national prin-

  ciples, an “untidy mix.” What Tamir argues for, in the title of her

  earlier book, is liberal nationalism; hers is a conditional defense

  of nationalism.

  Many liberals will no doubt think this goes too far toward glo-

  rifying some majority “identity” and “culture” at the expense of

  minorities. Stil , they will have to answer the challenge Tamir has

  put to them. Xenophobia and nativism have little justification,

  but this does not mean that the demand for recognition and dig-

  nity
of those left behind by neoliberal globalism is without

  moral value.

  Like almost every ideology, nationalism can be taken in de-

  structive or constructive directions. The great value of Tamir’s

  book is to show us that there is indeed a positive direction.

  The book goes much beyond bowing to the obvious reality that

  the nation- state is back; it presents a principled case for why we

  need it politically. Tamir argues we can and must harness nation-

  alism for the good of society. We better listen to her message

  before it is too late to fend off the extremists and save national-

  ism from the fascists.

  Dani Rodrik

  A

  Personal

  Note

  I am a strange political creature; I have been a labor activist all

  my adult life, a fully committed human rights activist (one of the

  founders of the Israeli peace movement and for a while the chair

  of the Israeli Human Rights Association) and a liberal political

  theorist. In my private life I was fortunate enough to be some-

  what of a global trotter. Hence it seemed only natural that I’d be

  a firm supporter of globalism and the set of values that comes

  with it: open borders, free trade, and free movement. But liber-

  alism always seemed to me missing the human point. A political

  theory should be attuned to human needs and aspirations, and

  liberalism has been adjusting itself to a very particular kind of

  life experience.

  It was probably my upbringing that made me attentive to na-

  tional claims. For many years my pro- nationalism views were

  seen, at best, as irrelevant, a relic of a troubling past that should be

  transcendent. At times my academic friends turned a blind eye; at

  others they hoped I’d grow out of it. But when everybody was

  rejoicing the victory of liberalism I went the other way. Maybe

  because of my years in politics (serving in two Israeli govern-

  ments, first as minister of immigration [1998– 2001] and then as

  minister of education [2006– 9]), I realized that the pull of the

  liberal argument was class- based— my class. I also followed,

  with great worry, the way members of other classes turned the

  other way. I could feel the earth trembling under liberal feet. It

  wasn’t due to the well- orchestrated joy of the liberal victory

  party—it was because the liberal party was restricted in scope;

  though all my friends were attending, many stayed outside the

  fence.

  xiv • A Personal Note

  In 2001 I ended a paper titled “Class and Nation” with the fol-

  lowing words:

  Defensive- regressive nationalism threatens those who are eager

  to ride the waves of global open markets. For them nationalism

  is no more than a set of burdensome sentimental recollections,

  for all the rest it is still the most profitable socio- economic op-

  tion. It is thus rational, for the immobile classes to try and force

  the mobile classes to participate in the nationalist game— they

  can easily be tempted to do so by exerting political pressures

  and quite often by means of social and political violence. When

  members of the mobile classes try, in order to loosen the social

  bonds, to either ignore or solve the conflict they are accused of

  non- patriotic tendencies. The class conflict has been translated

  into national terms.

  Marx was, then, wrong about the century in which class strug-

  gles will take place. If such struggles will erupt they will be in the

  twenty first century. And they will not feature the international soli-

  darity of the proletariat. They will be struggles in which the im-

  mobile classes fight against each other as well against their own

  mobile elites. Members of the middle classes for whom globaliza-

  tion is no less threatening are likely to join the immobile, making

  them a social power that cannot be ignored.

  The workers of the world will never unite. They have no real

  interest to do so. Nationalism is therefore here to stay. Yet it might

  turn from the vision of the elites into their nightmare. It will join

  hands with every ideology that fosters closer and justifies exclusion.

  Xenophobic nationalism, the kind fostered by Le- Pan, Jorg Hider,

  the late Pim Fortuyn, by advocates of transfer policies in Israel as

  well as by supporters of White Australia or White California, will

  become more popular. It is not, however, as many have suspected,

  a nationalism driven by irrational forces. It is a rational nationalism

  A Personal Note • xv

  driven by the self- interest of the masses to protect them from a

  global dream they cannot share.

  Can these developments be avoided or slowed down? The pres-

  ent global crisis provides an opportunity for change. The terrorist

  attack on September 11 made members of the mobile and affluent

  classes in America, and elsewhere, much more aware of their sus-

  ceptibility to life- threatening risks. The present economic crisis

  makes them aware of their economic vulnerability . This may inspire,

  in the upper classes, a will to come back home in order to form a

  new “risk pool” which will defend their interests, as well as the in-

  terests of lower classes. If this will be the outcome of September

  11th events then they will enhance national solidarity and delay the

  class struggle. If, however, the different classes keep marching on

  different routes, a moment of confrontation will arrive.1

  Needless to say, in the seventeen years since 9/11, things

  haven’t gotten any better; in fact, they have gotten worse. Many

  now realize it is time for change. This book is written with the

  hope that the present melancholy and sense of defeat among

  liberals will be replaced with a new political awareness that

  might lead to fresh political ideas and some better political

  arrangements.

  In order for such changes to happen, liberals should acknowl-

  edge that their theoretical and political mistakes were grounded

  in a misinterpretation of one of the most basic notions of all—

  human freedom. Freedom was never just about the ability to

  move or trade freely; it was about the ability of individuals to

  govern their life, make meaningful choices, and live productively.

  For several decades liberals consistently ignored the fact that

  these kinds of freedoms were restricted not only by race or gen-

  der but also by transgenerational poverty associated with one’s

  place of birth. The marginalization of class talk and the reluctance

  xvi • A Personal Note

  to turn the fight against poverty into a major motivational po-

  litical force channeled the liberal progressive debate away from

  questions that are relevant to the sinking middle. Members of

  the middle classes thus lost trust in the ruling liberal elites and

  questioned their wil ingness to protect the interests of the different

  social classes.

  We are therefore facing a unique historical moment character-

  ized by a decline in social trust and the erosion of liberal-

  progressive leadership. Libera
l democrats are asked to answer

  questions typical of constitutive moments: Who are we? What

  defines our common political identity? Why should we trust one

  another? And how can we work together to create a safer future?

  Unfortunately, they have no adequate answers.

  Nationalism has a long tradition of answering these same

  questions, and it is therefore back, yet without the balancing

  power of liberalism and democracy it can easily turn destructive.

  In order to prevent it from going astray, the three- way partner-

  ship among nationalism, liberalism, and democracy must be

  renewed. It has given the twentieth century some of its finest

  hours and could become the savior of the twenty- first century.

  The much- discussed crisis of modern democracies is inherently

  associated with the breakdown of this partnership. Democracy

  cannot be restored as a purely utilitarian project, only as a na-

  tional one— as a framework that provides meaning and reasons

  for mutual care and responsibility. Self- centered individualism

  must therefore be replaced with a more col ectivist spirit that

  nationalism knows how to kindle. This book is an attempt to

  offer a middle ground that can restore the power of the nation-

  state, making it more profitable for the many, not only for the few.

  Part I

  The Return of History

  Hope is certainly not the same thing as optimism. It is not the

  conviction that something will turn out wel , but the certainty

  that something makes sense regardless of how it turns out.

  Vaclav Havel, Distur bing the Peace (1986)

  1

  The New Nationalism

  It has been a long time since streets were crowded with people

  waving national flags; now people are marching all over the

  globe: in Barcelona, Britain, Austria, and France, in the main

  streets of Kurdistan, in the United States, and in the public

  squares of Istanbul. Flag waving for and against political causes

  is back in fashion. Nationalism is everywhere.

  The reemergence of nationalism has taken the world by sur-

  prise. This was supposed to be a liberal and democratic century;

  history was about to end and the flat world promised to bring

  the inhabitants of the globe closer together. Liberals believed that

  their century (starting from 1945) would see the end of wars, the