Why Nationalism Read online

  spread of reason, and the beginning of a new enlightenment. This

  vision captivated the imagination, promising endless economic

  growth, expanding opportunities, and an ongoing increase in

  well- being. Each generation was to be better off than its

  predecessors.

  Disappointingly, the twenty- first century opened with a se-

  ries of social and economic crises. Many of the achievements of

  the previous decades have come under threat; the young gen-

  erations fear the return of the crisis of capitalism and worry

  about the well- being of their parents and their children. No

  wonder that liberal optimism has lost its popularity and that

  those who several years ago chanted “Yes, We Can!” now suspect

  “we” cannot.

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  Trump’s election alongside Brexit, the growing support for

  separatist movements, the rise of the new right in many Euro-

  pean countries, and the phenomena of national and religious

  awakenings around the world leave liberals perplexed. They were

  convinced they were doing the right thing. Michael Moore

  proudly summarized their achievements:

  Things are better. The left has won the cultural wars. Gays and

  lesbians can get married. A majority of Americans now take the

  liberal position on just about every polling question posed

  to them: Equal pay for women— check. Abortion should be

  legal— check. Stronger environmental laws— check. More gun

  control— check. Legalize marijuana— check.1

  One day, on his way home, Moore was stopped by a man who

  said: “Mike . . . we have to vote for Trump. We HAVE to shake

  things up.” Why did he say that? The man’s words made Moore

  stop and think. This is the virtue of many of the recent political

  events; they force us to stop and reflect on the way we have in-

  terpreted the basic social and economic developments of the

  last half of a century.

  Historical turning points are difficult to detect—usually they

  are acknowledged in retrospect; the assassination of Archduke

  Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, the self- immolation of

  an unknown Tunisian street merchant, and the first inflatable

  boat loaded with refugees crossing the Mediterranean changed

  the world, yet it took some time before the massive scope of the

  change was acknowledged. We tend to analyze events in hind-

  sight. Why did the people revolt? Why did the refuges start

  to flee across the Mediterranean at a certain point in time? Why

  didn’t the man share Moore’s view that things are so much

  better? Much of this book is an answer to these questions, yet

  unlike many commentators who put the blame on those who

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  acted against their expectations, I ask a different question: why

  were the accumulating warning signs that the social and politi-

  cal crisis is deepening transparent to those in power? The

  blindness I am interested in is that of the elites.

  The present political upheaval is a necessary wake- up call, an

  invitation to admit that the liberal- progressive camp has made

  its mistakes and must look back on the last forty years with a

  sense of self- criticism. Many would like to think that the pres-

  ent state of affairs is no more than a sad coincidence; that things

  could easily have gone the other way, and soon they would go

  back to normal. They are wrong. Among Trump’s tweets, Le

  Pen’s slogans, and the demonstrations of the extreme right,

  some real concerns are hidden. It is dangerous to comfort one-

  self with the fact that actually Hil ary won the popular vote, Le

  Pen wasn’t elected, and Brexit supporters did not know what

  the European Union was all about and now regret their vote.

  Whether winning or losing, new powers entered the political

  game, and they cannot be ignored.

  In liberalism’s victorious years the Western world assumed it

  had outgrown nationalism; now that it is back it lacks the tools

  to accommodate its challenge. Why nationalism now? What pro-

  voked national feelings and national ideology and made them

  more relevant than ever? Is nationalism a dormant evil force wait-

  ing to pop out whenever there is a crisis, a force that must be

  repressed at all costs, or is it a constructive power, a worthwhile

  ideology that could and should be harnessed to make the world

  a better place? This book presents a case for nationalism, high-

  lighting the ways it shaped public policy and made the years be-

  tween the end of the world wars and the eruption of neoliberal

  globalism the best years for the least well- off members of the

  developed world.2 Some may say that these years were good ones

  because nationalism was repressed, allowing liberal democracy

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  to flourish. I, however, wish to argue the opposite— namely, that

  many of the achievements of that period were dependent on an

  alliance between the nation and the state.

  True, neither liberals nor nationalists are eager to expose their

  interdependencies— as with many odd couples, they wish to dis-

  tance themselves, avoiding the embarrassment associated with

  admitting they cannot do without each other. But they have been

  partners for years. The vigor and anger with which liberals are

  rejecting nationalism are not a sign of estrangement but a cover-

  up of a too- intimate reliance.

  Political ideologies would like to be self- sufficient; they trem-

  ble at the thought of their shortcomings being exposed. I wish

  to do exactly that— expose the ideological interdependencies

  that shape our world, arguing that the modern democratic state

  cannot have survived without the supportive hand of both lib-

  eral and national ideologies. My argument highlights areas where

  liberal democratic theory draws on national criteria to counter

  the pressures of globalism, and where nationalism relies on

  liberal- democratic principles to strengthen its claims for

  self- determination.

  The nation- state has been an ideal meeting point between the

  two, and hence it is here to stay. Democratic regimes require a

  pre- political partnership that turns citizens into a collective

  entity that has a common past and a common future. In the

  absence of a political we, states disintegrate, and the political

  structure that allows them to turn into democratic and decent

  entities dissolves.

  A political we had never been a natural phenomenon; it must

  be created, and then constantly nurtured, supported, and re-

  invented. This is an old truth that is easily forgotten. States are

  manmade entities that need to be cherished and maintained.

  Enchanted with what seemed to be their conclusive victory,

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  liberal democracies felt secure and ignored the ongoing work

  of state building. Confident that they would last forever, they

  neglected the need for ideological and political maintenance.

  They withdrew from the public sphere, became reluctant to
nur-

  ture a unifying cultural and political narrative that acculturates

  citizens to confront the evolving social and economic condi-

  tions. Invisible hands were expected to solve social problems

  and merge the different identities gathered under the wings of

  the Rainbow Coalition into a new social identity strong enough

  to carry the burden of the state. No wonder states are now facing

  an existential crisis.

  While liberal democrats were paralyzed by their assumed vic-

  tory, nationalists felt defeated and obsolete. In most of the de-

  veloped world they were taken to be outdated, carrying the voice

  of political immaturity, raising the kind of ideas civilized people

  don’t mention around a dinner table. They have therefore lost

  the ability to offer the state a supportive hand.

  With no one working to preserve its unique structure, the

  modern nation- state started crumbling down. Should we lament

  its disintegration? Many argue that nowadays it is more of a bur-

  den than an asset; that it fitted the needs of modernization but

  that it cannot meet the needs of a postindustrial world, that we

  should let it be torn apart by global and local forces and opt for

  a better alternative— yet none has so far emerged.

  The present social and political chaos exposes the damaging

  outcomes of the theoretical and political void caused by the

  demise of the nation- state. When states step aside they leave

  behind a social, political, economic, and cultural vacuum. The

  public sphere is emptied of ideological and motivational

  forces that could promote social solidarity and encourage the

  erection of mechanisms necessary to combat growing social

  alienation.

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  Even when state intervention is indispensable, the language

  used to justify it has been delegalized; national planning is as-

  sumed to be breeding inefficiency and corruption, undermining

  the productive spirit kindled by personal freedom. In time, re-

  sentment of the state crossed party lines, joining liberals and

  conservatives in a struggle for personal freedom. This led to the

  shrinking of the state and the erosion of its regulatory powers.

  Checks and balances were removed, allowing markets to shape

  public life. The weakness of the state alongside the prominence

  of the markets opened unprecedented opportunities for a new

  kind globalism that is individualistic rather than state governed.

  Each person was encouraged to compete on his/her own. In an

  age marked by competitiveness, people are ready to do “what-

  ever it takes” to have the upper hand. They compete internally

  and internationally without ever thinking of the larger social ef-

  fects of their actions. As a result, social and economic gaps grow,

  and the social contract held by a combination of democratic and

  national beliefs loses its power. With the spreading of social dis-

  array, some political players try to capture the opportunity and

  draft a new contract that would serve their interests. Seeking to

  justify their claims they turn to nationalism— which in modern

  times was, and still is, the greatest legitimizing political power.

  Present- day nationalism appears in two different forms, both

  grounded in the weakness of the state: the first, the more classic

  one, is to be found in Catalonia, Lombardy, and Vento as well

  as in Flanders, Transylvania, Scotland, Kurdistan, and lately

  Brazil. It represents the desire of national groups, concentrated

  in distinct territories, to capture the opportunity and demand

  self- rule. As this claim is voiced in the name of the people, such

  national movements try to recruit as many fellow nationals as

  possible. Consequently, they are inwardly inclusive, bringing on

  board each and every member of the nation regardless of age,

  The New Nationalism • 9

  gender, or class, nurturing a partnership among the elites, the

  middle classes, and the working classes to back the national

  agenda.

  Separatist national movements challenge the boundaries of

  existing states for both national and economic reasons. Often

  they represent the desire of the more affluent regions to be freed

  from the obligation to share their wealth with members of poorer

  regions they now take to be outsiders. The affluent attempt to

  rewrite the political contract in ways that will secure them bet-

  ter life chances, offering new political and cultural opportunities

  to their elites and a larger share of the national wealth to the

  people.

  The second kind of nationalism is the nationalism of the less

  wel - off, those left defenseless by the process of hyperglobaliza-

  tion.3 The vulnerable revoke national feelings in order to con-

  vince the elites to come back home from their global voyage and

  put their nation first. Because the vulnerable do not inhabit a

  defined territory or have a distinct identity, they define them-

  selves in opposition to others. From here, the distance to an

  aggressive, xenophobic type of nationalism is short. Yet, despite

  their brutal language and their association with hateful right-

  wing movements, many of the claims the vulnerable make are

  not without moral value. The demand to rewrite the social con-

  tract in ways that will answer their needs is a legitimate one.

  Their request to be included and fairly treated is as justified

  as their xenophobia is morally unwarranted.

  The nationalism of the vulnerable is a revolt against the

  betrayal of the global elites. The vulnerable rightly feel it is un-

  just that those who exploit cheap labor and natural resources

  overseas are al owed to portray themselves as moral universal-

  ists, while those trying to defend their jobs and their future

  back home are labeled as narrow- minded bigots. They would like

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  their claims to be taken seriously rather than rejected offhand,

  dismissed as populists or reactionaries.

  Liberals would like us to believe that nationalists are morally

  inferior to globalists. They conveniently ignore the strong cor-

  relation between social class and political preferences. Some

  suggest that this correlation attests to the fact that moral and

  political competence varies among members of the different

  social classes, or to put it bluntly, that the more educated and

  affluent exercise better judgment than the rest. My theory travels

  between the two types of nationalism, making it harder to pin

  nationalism on the hil bil ies, the rednecks, or European right-

  wing extremists. The savvy people of Catalan and northern Italy

  force us to think harder about the origins of nationalism and its

  role in the contemporary political reality.

  It is easier to be a globalist if you are likely to enjoy the ben-

  efits of an open market, or to support free immigration if you

  feel secure in your social status and do not fear that newcomers

  are going to take your job, or reduce the value of your property

  by r
enting the next- door apartment, forcing your neighborhood

  schools to face new challenges. Likewise, it is logical to be against

  separatism if you think you might be on the losing side and sup-

  port it if you expect to enjoy its benefits. This means that moral

  and social luck plays an important role in determining the scope

  of values and behaviors individuals are likely to consider and

  are able to endorse.4 If one’s position in the national- global de-

  bate strongly correlates to one’s actual interests and expecta-

  tions, there is no reason to describe one side as being more

  rational, moral, or open- minded than the other. Exposing the

  rational aspects hidden in national choices, and contrary to

  most commentators, I suggest that the reemergence of national

  feelings is a sensible response to the present social, political, and

  The New Nationalism • 11

  economic circumstances rather than an uncontrolled outburst

  of destructive human qualities.

  Nationalism has always been part of the modern political

  world, at times occupying the back seat, at others the front row.

  The persistence of nationalism attests to its inherent value. This

  book aims to enumerate the assets that nationalism brings to the

  political discourse and examine a variety of national claims with-

  out falling into the ad hominem trap of rebutting ideas by at-

  tacking the people making the argument or those associated with

  them. The present political discourse deals far too often with the

  (problematic) personalities of the deliverers rather than with

  the issues themselves. It is therefore important to emphasize

  that what follows is not an argument in support of any particu-

  lar leader or political movement but an examination of the

  accuracy of theoretical claims judged on their own merit.

  The text tries to keep a calm tone, avoiding the hysteria or mel-

  ancholia characteristic of present- day political exchanges; it

  takes a step back in order to get some perspective and encour-

  age intellectual modesty so desperately needed these days. In

  this spirit it shuns inflated declarations and false promises and

  tries to adjust expectations to the social and political conditions

  of our time. Much of the present- day sense of disappointment

  is grounded in the inability of both theorists and political lead-

  ers to break away from the illusion that all problems can be